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Memory, political culture and institutional change: a comparative perspective 
 
The scope of my project is ambitious, probably excessively so. I would like to identify those 
elements of memory that impinge upon the political culture both of the elites and of the citizens 
and exercise an impact on (the construction of) the institutions. Memories of past political 
occurrences which according to the interpretation by specific and significant social groups 
(and/or influential elites) are defined extremely important and dramatic significantly contribute 
to the shaping of political culture, opening and/or foreclosing alternative paths to change. My 
initial hypothesis is those interpretations are especially significant when they refer to dramatic 
events whose recurrence must be prevented. In a way, they may be structured as warning 
memories or negative memories. My intervening hypothesis is that, when there are several 
carriers of different memories who try to affect institutional change, it is more likely that the 
winners will be those who promise change, perhaps, a limited amount of change, with respect 
to the past. My concluding hypothesis is that, nevertheless, even defeated memories will 
maintain a presence in the political culture at large or of some specific groups, provided they are 
enshrined in a political organization.  
   Perhaps, more than just a suggestive footnote, let me add that much or most of what I plan to 
write about could also be rephrased as narrative. Indeed, narrative may have an advantage over 
memory because it refers to objectified memories, as they appear in documents, textbooks, 
speeches, etc., whereas memory refers essentially to what is in the heads of specific individuals 
and social groups. I am afraid I will be unable to keep the two concepts clearly separate and I 
will bounce back and forth on both of them. Hopefully, my bouncing will be stimulating and 
useful.    
The concepts.  At the outset, I think it is appropriate to focus on some, at least preliminary, 
definitions.  The most preliminary and tentative of all definitions concerns “memory”. 
Fundamentally, I am interested in what the political actors remember of past political events, 
what they consider relevant for their political behavior, and, above all, what they think useful, 
appropriate, indispensable to “enshrine” in the institutions/Constitution of their political 
systems. This is not to imply that there are no other avenues through which memories can make 
to count, for instance, organizing memorials, celebrating dates, writing school textbooks, 
shaping curricula. And, indeed, a comparative study of these elements promises to be highly 
rewarding and … extremely complex and time‐consuming. In a sentence, in my study, what I call 
memory refers almost exclusively to political events, phenomena, actors, to what, according to 
the carriers of the memories, must not be forgotten in order to avoid repeating the political 
past. However, the focus will be not on what is remembered, but more precisely on those who 
remember, that is, the social and political carriers of the memories (in Max Weber’s words the 
Trägerschichten).   
   Political culture remains an elusive as well as a controversial expression. Mostly, it has been 
used to refer to attitudes, orientations, feelings and evaluations of political “objects”: the self 
and its role in the political system;  the knowledge of the workings of the political system; the 
relationship between the self and the political system.  Though these three components may be 
subject to change, especially under the impact of dramatic events, most authors would stress 
that changes in political culture are rare, slow, limited, often of a generational nature.   
Long forgotten by US political scientists during the so‐called behavioral revolution, the study of 
institutional change made its re‐appearance in the early Sixties only to blossom and, seemingly, 
to thrive in the past two decades or so. There is now an overall agreement that institutions are 
patterns of behavior: rules, procedures, arrangements that consist of and produce orderly 
interactions. In a way, a Constitution contains a variety of institutional arrangements aimed at 
constructing and maintaining political order. Institutions are created, transformed, overturned, 
replaced. On the whole, however, they exhibit a fair amount of stability. Their functioning and 
their transformation are affected by the political memories and the political culture. In turn, 
they affect both.  
The problem.  Most studies of “political development” in its heyday from the Iate fifties to the 
early seventies contained references to institution‐building. However, in post‐colonial countries 
there could not be very much of a memory to be put to work in order to create new institutions. 
Hence, the models, if any, for the processes of both nation‐building and state‐building had to 
come from European and American experiences. Since we are at Columbia, let me underline 
that a famous political sociologist, Seymour M. Lipset, who received his doctorate in 1949, 
wrote an excellent analysis of the USA as The First New Nation: the USA in historical and 
comparative perspective, New York, Basic Books, 1963. The apparently obvious conclusion was 
that there is not much to be imitated from the exceptional US experience. The question still 
looms large regarding what and how can be “exported” and/or imported and which, if any, 
components of the US models have some cross‐country relevance and validity.  
In any case, my focus will not be on export/import of models and on possible imitations, but on 
learning through memory and on applying those memories to shaping institutional change. 
Thereafter, perhaps, on the basis of what will seem possible to learn from some specific cases, a 
more general view, a quasi theory may emerge. For reasons of expertise, but also because they 
have a lot to say concerning the impact of memory on political culture and institutional change, I 
have chosen three European cases: France, Germany, and Italy. Of course, the three countries 
had gone through a more or less intense authoritarian/totalitarian phase. Moreover, to 
overcome and go beyond their past they all had to formulate a new Constitution.  What I will be 
analyzing is how the process of Constitution‐making has been affected by the memories of the 
major political actors concerning previous important and, by all means, dramatic events and 
which consequences those memories have had on the choice of the institutional solutions.  
   No Constitution is ever simply the product of some, no matter how original and sound, 
technical and specialized knowledge. Especially when there is no fallback position, that is when 
it is imperative to draft a Constitution, the wisest of the Constitution‐makers will try to find and 
will rely on what I am going to call a founding myth. In some cases, however, that kind of myth 
will simply not be available. Hence the Constitution will dangerously float between a past 
absolutely to be rejected and a future imperatively to be constructed. Of course, then, much will 
depend on how the constitution‐makers (want to) remember of that past and on the impact of 
that past on the goals that have to be defined. Leaving aside all these somewhat abstract, 
though necessary, statements, my paper will go through three different stages. I will first offer 
an extremely synthetic overview of the past of the three political systems I have chosen and I 
will suggest which were the pitfalls and the traps to be avoided in the eyes and declarations of 
the Constitution makers. Second, I will see which institutional solutions were proposed and 
approved to avoid the reappearance and the repetition of all past mistakes. Third, in the 
conclusion, I will evaluate whether the institutional solutions that have been implemented have 
in practice also been successful.  At least in a preliminary way, the measure of success will be 
represented by the lack of reappearance of the problems having characterized the previous 
(mal)functioning of the institutions.  
France. My exploration starts with the case of France. There are two good reasons to begin with 
France. The first one is simply chronological. Approved in October 1946, the Constitution of the 
Fourth French Republic precedes the Italian Constitution that was approved in December 1947 
and the German Grundgesetz (officially and deliberately not a Constitution) approved in May 
1949.  Moreover, France generously provides the scholars with a second post‐war Constitution 
to be analyzed, that of the Fifth Republic approved by referendum in September 1958 and 
enacted few days afterwards in October. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic avoided any reflection, 
consideration, evaluation of what had gone wrong with pre‐1940 French politics, responsible for 
making room for a swift defeat inflicted by Nazi tanks and for the puppet collaborationist regime 
of Vichy led by Marshal Pėtain. Contrary to the preferences and the suggestions of Gen. de 
Gaulle, the Fourth Republic appeared to be nothing more and nothing better than a limited 
cosmetic revision of the Third Republic. Strenuously opposed by de Gaulle, the first draft was 
rejected by French voters in May 1946. The second slightly revised draft, that remained 
unpalatable to de Gaulle, was approved in October 1946, as the General drily remarked “à la 
minorité des faveurs” because the number of those who voted “no” plus of those who did not 
go to the polls was higher than the number of those who were favorable and voted “yes”. In a 
more extended comment, he noted that the Constitution had been approved by 9 million 
voters, rejected by 8 millions and ignored by 8 millions. Understandably, the Fourth Republic 
never enjoyed a high level of legitimacy, and de Gaulle never stopped his attempt to 
delegitimize its Constitution. Finally and, probably, inevitably, the Fourth Republic collapsed. It 
was not just because of the crisis of decolonization and the war lost in Indochina. The decisive 
detonator was provided by the request of independence by the Algerians. But the causes of the 
collapse ran deeper in the very fabric of the Constitution and the political system of the Fourth 
Republic. The régime des partis had discredited itself even more sinking into a dismal sequence 
of short‐lived, litigious, unproductive governments, vindicating de Gaulle’s continuous scathing 
criticisms.  
   Here one may find the paradox of two distinctive memories. On the one hand, there were the 
traditional politicians of the Third and Fourth Republics all too willing to revive the only political 
game whose rules were well‐known to them. They proved unable to reflect on what had gone 
wrong during the Third Republic and had continued to go wrong throughout the Fourth 
Republic. Those traditional politicians refused to entertain the idea that the political and military 
weakness of France had been largely due to her institutional arrangements. It may be 
interesting to remark that among them was to be found François Mitterrand, later to become 
President of the Fifth Republic for two terms (1981‐1988 and 1988‐1995) who made his first 
steps of successful career during Vichy and the Fourth Republic, later becoming one of the most 
sanguine opponent of those very institutions that would serve his ambition very profitably. On 
the other hand, there was a lonely, austere, intransigent General and a handful of loyal 
collaborators, all distrustful of politics. 
   De Gaulle’s preferences were quite different from those politicians’ and not the manipulated 
product of afterthoughts. They were clearly spelled out in his pre‐Second World War 
statements, pamphlets and books, and in his memoirs.  On the one hand, he was fully steeped in 
the French historical tradition of great political leaders, of heroes. On the other hand, he 
thought he had clearly understood the roots of the problems and he was confident that the 
blame had to be put on the nature of the Republic’s institutions offering too much political 
space to the parties and their petty voracious leaders. In the transition from the Fourth to the 
Fifth Republic, there was another important memory that counted in a highly significant way, 
more than one would have expected. It was the popular memory that attributed to Gen. de 
Gaulle the role of savior of France. Indeed, though he had fled the country when it was 
conquered by the Nazis, his relentless efforts to organize a domestic network of active 
opposition not only against the occupants, but also against the regime of Vichy, meant that the 
dignity of France was saved and it almost became enshrined in his persona. 
Two general memories played a significant role in shaping de Gaulle’s constitutional vision. The 
first was, as I have briefly anticipated, the role played by great personalities in French history: 
foremost, Jeanne d’Arc and Napoleon. The second memory was represented by the negative 
role played by political parties, party leaders enmeshed in their incessant, selfish bickering. The 
institutional solutions followed suit. De Gaulle wanted to create a new relationship between 
French voters and their representatives and office‐holders. Here I will not enter into the specific 
details of the French double ballot run off electoral system. Applied in single‐member 
constituencies this electoral system offers the opportunity, both to the voters and the 
candidates, to put a premium on personal qualities, that is, to personalize both electoral 
competition and political representation. Personalities are, of course, the best antidote against 
the headless and irresponsible régime des partis. Politics is also about creating some 
psychological identification between the citizens and  their political leaders and representatives. 
De Gaulle was perfectly placed to offer this kind of psychological identification. However, he 
wanted to do more.  
   The popular election of the President of the Republic was meant to free the voters from too 
tight an affiliation with their parties (in France always comparatively weak). The Constitution of 
the Fifth Republic also offered the opportunity or, better, was so designed as to accommodate 
de Gaulle’s personal charisma. The exceptional personal and political qualities of a man who had 
twice saved France were purposefully “institutionalized”, as Max Weber would put it, in the 
institutions of the Fifth Republic. Though not especially committed to it, de Gaulle did not 
oppose a second form of institutionalization of his charisma that, this time, could take place in a 
party never explicitly called “Gaullist”. No doubt could exist on the origins of that party, 
variously named through time, on its nature, and, as long as de Gaulle remained in politics, on 
who was the leader. That the Gaullist party was a successful case of institutionalization of the 
General’s charisma is proved by several facts. It has easily survived the death of its founder. It 
has accommodated different leaders and sustained several Presidents. As of today, the Union (a 
typical Gaullist word) pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) continues to be by far the dominant 
party of the French party system.          
Italy. In 1945 the Italian situation was quite different from the French one, but not such as to 
make any comparison impossible. However, the impact of Fascism on the Italian political culture 
had of course been much greater than that of Vichy. Moreover, in a way it had obliged the 
Italians to face squarely their authoritarian past while the French tried to sweep all the traces of 
Vichy under the carpet of a temporary experience imposed on them by the Nazis. Inevitably, all 
those who were elected to the Constituent Assembly had had a personal experience of life 
under Fascism, even though several of them had spent some or much of their time abroad, in 
self‐imposed exile. Some of the members of the Constituent Assembly had also served in 
political roles before the advent of Fascism, that is, in the limited (in terms of voting rights) 
democracy and liberal State run by Giovanni Giolitti (1900‐1914). Nevertheless, it quickly 
became clear to all of them that they were going to live through an entirely new situation and to 
play a totally different ballgame in which mass parties were going to become the dominant 
actors, soon all too dominant. Two memories competed for attention as well as in terms of 
influence on the drafting of the Italian Constitution. In a way, the Constitution contains a 
blending, a merger of both memories. On the one hand, the Constituents interpreted Fascism 
not so much as a social movement, but as a regime that had been constructed by one powerful 
man: Benito Mussolini. On the other hand, many of them appeared to have overestimated the 
impact of anti‐fascism and the Resistance on the political culture of the Italians. Several political 
and institutional “translations” and transformations followed. 
   If Fascism had fundamentally been the creation of one man, then it was imperative  to 
organize the new political and institutional system in such a way that no facilitating condition 
would ever again make its reappearance. Widely entertained in the Constituent Assembly, this 
position was congruent with the feelings of those who believed that Giolittian liberal democracy 
had been fundamentally sound, but betrayed by the King who was responsible for appointing 
Mussolini head of the government. Once, having gotten rid of the Monarchy, Italy could re‐
instate a traditional parliamentary democracy. The political discourse could easily and smoothly 
reconnect with the pre‐Fascist democratic experience. The best indication that this 
reconnection was recommended especially by the stratum of Liberal politicians is found in the 
beginning line of the first editorial column published in “il Corriere della Sera” by one of its most 
prestigious collaborators, Luigi Einaudi, later Governor of the Bank of Italy and first President of 
the Italian Republic. Its incipit “Heri dicebamus” (“Yesterday, we were saying…”) tells it all. In 
fact, if one is looking for an example of a powerful alternative narrative or counter‐narrative, 
Luigi Einaudi’s appears almost perfect. Here one is offered the interpretation of Fascism as a 
temporary interruption of a slowly developing, but unstoppable, democratic experience, as 
propounded by the famous liberal philosopher Benedetto Croce for whom Fascism had just 
been a parenthesis without consequences and, just like the eight hundred years of occupation 
of Egypt by the Hyksos, had left no traces whatsoever. There is also the implicit suggestion that 
it was not only possible, but advisable to turn the clock back. There is, finally, the confidence 
that the old times can be revived because, after all, they were not too bad.   
   There was an implicit convergence of this view with the memory of the leaders and 
parliamentarians of the mass parties who desired to eliminate the institutional arrangements 
that had made possible the concentration of political power in the hands of Benito Mussolini. 
Later, this overall attitude was defined as “the complex of the tyrant”. The institutional 
consequence was highly significant. The expression “capo del governo” was banned from the 
political language. The two words “Prime Minister” were knowingly and explicitly rejected. The 
head of the government was deliberately called “President of the Council of Ministers” to signal 
and stress that he was not a primus super pares, but only a primus inter pares, not a first above 
equals, but a first among equals.  Of course, it was not just a matter of words. The actual powers 
allocated to the President of the Council of Ministers were so limited that, at the end of their 
day, even the Constituents realized that something had to be done. But the wise 
recommendation drafted and voted by a large majority meant to “find institutional mechanisms 
to stabilize Italian governments” remained without consequences. In a parliamentary 
democracy, all governments are bound to be at the mercy of their parliaments. In the Italian 
case all parliaments were (and, on the whole, still are) dominated by political parties. Hence, 
Italian governments have been at the mercy of Italian parties and, very often, of party factions.  
Nevertheless, just for the record, all things considered, between 1946 and 1958, there were 
fewer governments and fewer heads of government in Italy than in France.    
   It is difficult to say whether in drastically limiting the power(s) of the President of the Council 
of Ministers one could also refer to a deep‐seated component of the Italian political culture. The 
saying is often quoted that Italy is a country of “poets and navigators, saints and artists”. It also 
includes heroes, but it remains unclear if these heroes are, indeed, political leaders. Most 
certainly, Giuseppe Garibaldi is the paramount national Italian hero. But the Risorgimento was 
led and accomplished by an Italian political class, the Destra Storica, guided by Camillo Benso 
Count of Cavour, most certainly not interested in, as one would say today, personalizing his 
politics and becoming a “hero”. Even the Resistance movement shun away from personalization. 
Indeed, there is no official leader/hero of the Resistance. Several men, all of them prominent, 
none of them more important than the others, led the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale 
dell’Alta Italia (CLNAI). Therefore, for better or worse, there was no charisma to be 
institutionalized into the Italian Constitution.    
   The attempt was made to institutionalize the collective memory of antifascism and the 
Resistance. More precisely, for more than twenty years or so following its approvaI, most 
politicians, though especially those on the left, would begin all speeches and celebrations 
referring to the Constitution and the Italian Republic as born from and grounded on antifascism 
and the Resistance. In a way, the antifascist character of the Italian Constitution was located, 
perhaps, relegated in the Disposizioni transitorie e finali, where it is clearly stated that “the re‐
organization of the disbanded Fascist party is forbidden in whatever form”.  Perhaps, 
antifascism and the Resistance movement always were a founding myth for the minority of 
Italian citizens. In truth, especially throughout the thirties Fascism enjoyed a fair amount of 
(passive) consensus and active antifascism was largely practiced through a limited number of 
individual actions with no political consequences. The large majority of Italians, more or less 
consciously, accommodated themselves in a wide gray area. In the post‐war period, it was easy 
for these Italians to deny any personal allegiance to Fascism and therefore not to reckon with 
the authoritarian nature of the regime. Of course, as a consequence, this also meant that there 
was no collective shared memory of the past. The re‐invention of an anti‐fascist past could not 
at all work. Like the Risorgimento, though slightly less, the Resistance had been a phenomenon 
involving only some areas of Italy: a four‐day event in Naples; for some time, the city of Rome; 
then, Tuscany and all the regions North of the Appennines. At the end of the war, the quality of 
combatant partisans was recognized to about 230 thousand men and women. Finally, though it 
can be said that most of the time the partisans had indeed received support from the 
population, this by no means produced massive consensus for their ideas and their projects. 
Even more so because the partisans and their parties entertained  quite different ideas 
concerning the meaning of the Resistance and the future of Italy.  
   In Italy there have always been serious complaints and widespread preoccupations concerning 
the existence of a very weak, almost evanescent sense of belonging to a national State. The oft‐
quoted sentence attributed to Massimo D’Azeglio, one of the leading personalities of the Destra 
Storica, “fatta l’Italia bisogna fare gli italiani” were clearly inspired  by the above‐mentioned 
preoccupation. No wonder then that, among other goals, such as providing for a democratic 
framework in which sovereignty belongs to the people, but there is a precise allocation of 
powers to the different institutions, in which the citizens enjoy inalienable rights, but they must 
also fulfill unavoidable duties, the Italian Constitution was meant to embody the most important 
political memories, as selected by the Constitution‐makers, and to make them a shared cultural 
patrimony.  
The founding myth of the Resistance was absolutely necessary to minimize the level of conflict 
among the parties, especially between the governments led by the Christian Democrats and the 
opposition of the Socialists and the Communists during the first phase of the Cold War. But the 
myth also performed the task of hiding the reality of the different motivations of the combatant 
partisans when fighting against the Nazis and the Fascist puppet regime of Salo’.  In a book , 
perhaps not enough famous, Claudio Pavone has argued that the Resistance comprised three 
overlapping, but distinct, wars. Working with a wealth of different types of documents, including 
recollections and memories of many who fought those wars, the left‐wing historian has come to 
the persuasive identification of the simultaneous presence of a war of national liberation, a class 
war and a civil war. Defeating the Germans and pushing them out of the Italian territory was the 
main goal of those who were fighting a war of national liberation. But the Nazis were the allies 
of Fascism and the sponsors and indispensable supporters of the Fascist Republic of Salo’. 
Therefore, the partisans were obliged to fight also a civil war against their fellow citizens who 
had remained within the Fascists ranks or joined them. All partisans were fighting for the 
recovery of the dignity of their motherland, but some aspired to a totally new political system 
and to new society. They wanted something resembling the then much extolled and little known 
Soviet Union. Those partisans felt they were also fighting a class war against the Italian 
bourgeoisie, the entrepreneurs and the landowners who had been responsible for the advent of 
Fascism and had thrived under its brutal rule. For them, the Resistance was the first step toward 
a socialist revolution and a truly new Italy. 
    The war of national liberation was won, but many Italians believed that the contribution of 
the Resistance had been limited and that the success was due to the presence and the activities 
of the Allied Forces. The civil war was won by the partisans, but obviously in too many areas 
there never was a single unified memory. Once more a large gray area made its appearance 
between those who were praising the Resistance and those who nourished resentment and 
hate, who felt their feelings were neglected and despised, who believed that history had been 
manipulated. Five decades later, a famous allegedly left‐wing journalist, Giampaolo Pansa, has 
exploited those memories and feelings and taken advantage of the revisionist “spirit of the 
time” to write a number of highly publicized, best‐selling books of no historical value. The class 
war was definitely not won. It did not even come close to success. The Communists (I do not 
want to be more precise than this) thought that it was and/or it had to be postponed. This gave 
birth to the belief that the Resistance had been betrayed. Then and later, in the sixties, the 
Communists were accused of that betrayal. Some groups making part of the red terrorist galaxy 
did indeed claim that the time had come for a New Resistance.  
Since I am dealing with the relationship between memory, political culture and institutional 
change, I must underline that the legend of the Resistance betrayed was also entertained by 
components of the Resistance movement other than the Communists. Indeed, the most 
important statement to this effect was written by one of the most influential Constitution‐
makers belonging to the Partito d’Azione. Piero Calamandrei, professor of Constitutional Law at 
the University of Florence, wrote that the Italian Constitution was “a promised revolution in 
exchange for a failed revolution”.  If the promise also consisted in a sort of reconciliation of 
divided memories, it is now clear that it is a failed promise. Judging from the thirty‐year long and 
sterile debate on constitutional reforms, not only do collective memories in Italy appear sharply 
divided, but any type of convergence seems absolutely unlikely. Indeed, the recurrent debate on 
the reform of the Constitution has not provided any meaningful solution. It has only 
exacerbated the differences conspicuously exploited by unscrupulous oblivious politicians.      
   
Germany. Of all countries, it was in Germany that the memory of the past could not be more 
traumatic and more devastating. It was also accompanied by a deep, though not fully shared, 
feeling of (historical and, perhaps, collective) guilt.  The simple loss of entire German enclaves in 
Eastern Europe and the partition of her territory meant that there were millions of refugees as 
much humbled as enraged. At first, the country was militarily occupied and her overall destiny 
was uncertain. The occupation by the Allied Military Forces and by the Soviet Union continued 
while the Constitution was being drafted and finally approved in 1949. By that time Germany 
had been partitioned. The leaders of West Germany, that is of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
decided to leave the door open to reunification. Therefore, the text they approved was not 
given the title and the status of Constitution, but of Fundamental Norm: Grundgesetz. Such 
remained until 1990 when an accelerated, critics would say hasty, reunification took place and 
the Grundgesetz became with few necessary adjustments the Constitution of Germany. Still, it 
did not change its name to Verfassung. 
  Much had gone wrong in the Weimar Republic, both from the political and from the 
institutional point of view. There also exists a massive amount of literature exploring the social 
causes of the collapse of Weimar and relating it to some aspects of the so‐called “German 
character”.  Even though the international environment put a lot of pressures on Weimar 
Germany, there was nothing inevitable in the collapse of the democratic Republic. In any case 
what counts for my analysis are the memories entertained by the post‐war political actors and 
the role they played in the drafting of the Grundgesetz. As a matter of fact, in Germany the 
situation was much more complicated than in France and in Italy. Even though defeated, 
devastated, and occupied, Germany remained more important from the point of view of the 
dynamics of international affairs than the two other countries. In addition, those interested and 
involved in reorganizing the political system were not just German domestic politicians. There 
were two other sets of actors: the Allied Forces, though, enmeshed in their own problems, the 
French quickly renounced any attempt to exercise influence, and their advisors and consultants 
plus German politicians and political scientists who had gone and lived in exile.  
All the constitutional solutions that were searched and explored had to be capable of addressing 
the overall problem that was central to the preoccupations of all scholars and politicians: what 
had gone wrong in Weimar? This question can be re‐stated with specific reference to the 
Weimar Constitution. Hence, which, if any, institutions and mechanisms of the first democratic 
German Constitution should  be considered responsible, in the evaluations of a variety of 
political and technical actors, for creating the conditions leading to the collapse?  
   When discussing the Weimar Constitution two elements are often underestimated or even 
neglected. The first element is that it was drafted by some of the most important, widely 
respected and acclaimed professors of constitutional law of the time. Technically, it was also 
considered almost a juridical, legal‐formal jewel. The second element is that the Weimar 
Constitution has in some ways been resurrected or resuscitated, more or less knowingly and 
deliberately, by those who have drafted the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic. Indeed, 
the Weimar Constitution represents the prototype of semi‐presidential regimes. In itself, the 
Weimar Constitution was not simply a rational and appropriate response to technical 
imperatives. It was also the product of a cultural environment in which important and influential 
analyses had been carried out as to the allocation and exercise of leadership and political power, 
for instance, by Max Weber and Roberto Michels.  In itself, this would be another splendid topic 
for (comparative) research.   
The two most controversial components of the Weimar Constitution considered responsible for 
facilitating its collapse are: first, the direct popular election of the President of the Republic 
endowed with significant executive powers and, second, the proportional electoral system. 
Obviously, both were grounded in persuasive argumentations. The demise of the Emperor 
required that his successor enjoyed a comparable legitimacy, especially after a lost war, and the 
direct popular election involving all the citizens could in practice provide that type of legitimacy. 
There was no doubt at the time that Germany was a highly diversified society in terms of 
political preferences. Hence a proportional electoral system seemed the most appropriate to 
provide for the representation of all relevant political preferences. This was the solution 
considered by far preferable by one the most famous and influential professors of comparative 
law, Hans Kelsen. Moreover, it was already well known that PR makes it very difficult for the 
winners to obtain the absolute majority of seats and for the losers to be reduced to a negligible 
minority. In a way, not only is PR considered apparently more capable of providing satisfactory 
political representation, it is also a “defensive” electoral formula.  
We have seen that in Italy the “complex of the tyrant” played a perhaps exaggerated role in 
curtailing the figure and the powers of the President of the Council of Ministers. In Germany 
there was no doubt from the beginning that any and all popular elections of the executive could 
not make part of the new Grundgesetz. The price to be paid was going to be a very slow process 
of political identification by the Germans with their new political system. On balance, it was 
considered an acceptable price. However, though highly facilitated by the visibility given to him 
by his success in the presidential elections, Hitler’s ascent to power was not simply to be 
attributed to his personal popularity. Indeed, most Constitution‐makers pointed to the 
instability of German governments and to the weakness of the Chancellors vis‐à‐vis Parliament 
(to be more precise, the Reichstag) as the conditions that had worn out the solidity and the 
legitimacy of the institutions and opened the way to Hitler.  
This specific political memory, that is, the double vulnerability of the Chancellor, produced 
perhaps one of the most important institutional innovations ever devised in parliamentary 
democracies to protect and to buttress the head of the government: the constructive vote of no 
confidence.  Disorganized, litigious, ideologically distant and incompatible oppositions may join 
to defeat a government and oust its leader. However, they may not be able to give birth to a 
different and better government supported by a more cohesive parliamentary majority.  The 
constructive vote of no confidence has proved to be an excellent mechanism from several points 
of view. First of all, an aspect that is often underestimated, it has worked as a deterrent. All 
those who may want to weaken, to defeat and to replace a government and its Chancellor are 
possibly/probably deterred from doing so by the need to rely on a new pre‐confectioned 
majority. This is why there have been only two instances in which the constructive vote of no 
confidence was put to use: in 1972 and in 1982. In the first case, the Christian Democrats 
activated it against the incumbent Socialdemocratic Chancellor Willy Brandt, but they failed to 
muster enough votes to replace him. It is of some interest to recall that the losing Christian 
Democratic candidate Rainer Barzel immediately thereafter disappeared from the political 
scene.  In the second case, the procedure worked perfectly according to the rules. The Christian 
Democrats and the Liberals tabled a motion of no confidence against the incumbent 
Socialdemocratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and ousted him. Within the mandatory forty‐eight 
hours (I venture to hypothesize that  such a short period of time was chosen in order to make 
impossible ex‐post facto protracted dealings) they voted the confidence to the incoming 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl opening the way to the second longest (the longest remains that of the 
Swedish Socialdemocratic Prime minister Tage Erlander, 1946‐1969) consecutive tenure for a 
head of government in the history of contemporary democracies: sixteen years (up to 1998) and 
victory in four national elections.  
Second, it has most certainly provided for a spectacular political stability of German 
governmental coalitions, governments and, of course, Chancellors. On the whole there have 
been four types of governmental coalitions in Germany: CDU‐FDP (1949‐1966; 1982‐1998; 2009‐
‐2013 ); SPD‐FDP (1969‐1982); SPD‐Greens (1998‐2005); CDU‐SPD (1966‐1969; 2005‐2009). 
Though there have been several, rarely large, reshuffles, most German governments have 
completed their entire parliamentary term without significant changes in the most important 
ministries. What is probably hard to believe is that in the 1949‐2009 period there have been 
fewer German Chancellors than British Prime Ministers (not to speak of course of French and 
Italian heads of government), to be precise  eight vs twelve. 
Finally, the vote of constructive no‐confidence has allowed a very smooth transition in the only 
case, in 1982, when it has worked through its full procedure. This is not a small achievement 
both for Germany and in comparative perspective. 
Most scholars converged in criticizing the proportional electoral system utilized in the Weimar 
Republic. Many have considered it responsible for the fragmentation of the party system and, as 
a consequence, for the subsequent difficulty in the formation of the governments (and a cause 
of their instability). The most uncompromising and bellicose critic, not just of the type of 
proportional representation utilized in the Weimar Republic, but of all proportional electoral 
laws was Ferdinand Hermens. While in exile in the United States, he published two books 
explicitly devoted to a dismantlement of any virtue proportional systems might have or claim. 
He was adamantly in favor of the first past the post system applied, of course, in single‐member 
constituencies. For reasons having to do with their own political experience, understandably 
both the English and the American advisors to the process of institution‐making were inclined to 
support the idea that a plurality system would better serve the purpose of creating a viable 
democratic regime. However, not all German scholars were sharing Hermens’ diagnosis on the 
electoral reasons leading to the collapse of Weimar nor his prognosis, that is, the enactment of a 
plurality system.  Paramount and decisive were the different views and preferences formulated 
and expressed by the large majority of German politicians, not only those who had lived in Nazi 
Germany and survived.  
   For many good reasons, that I have already briefly sketched above, they reached an 
overarching  agreement on the need for a proportional electoral law. Following twelve years of 
National‐Socialism, in a devastated, impoverished and occupied country, German politicians 
believed that it was indispensable to obtain as faithful a representation of political preferences 
as possible. Nevertheless, on the one hand, the memory of party fragmentation loomed large on 
very many of them. Hence, they decided to introduce a five per cent clause for the parties to 
obtain parliamentary representation. On the other, the idea that voters and candidates ought to 
enter into a closer relationship than that usually provided by PR seemed appealing. Accepting 
several indications and suggestions deriving from the Anglo‐American experiences, the Germans 
came to devise an intelligent structure of the ballot on which the voters could choose on the left 
side their preferred candidate and on the right side their preferred party (and could also 
proceed to split their vote). This way, personalized proportional representation came into being, 
not fully rejecting the electoral formula of the past, but creatively redefining it.   
   When the five per cent clause was introduced it had already become clear that neither the 
Nazi Party nor the Communist Party would muster enough votes to overcome it and to obtain 
parliamentary representation. All the defects of proportional representation in terms of party 
fragmentation and coalition instability should not hide that, in the end, the problem of the 
Weimar party system was the dynamics of the competition that was deployed because of the 
combined existence of two anti‐system  parties: the Nazis and the Communists. The essence of 
this competition that doomed Weimar was captured and given theoretical dignity by Giovanni 
Sartori’s model of polarized pluralism. Both opposition parties wanted, in fact, to destroy the 
system so they could temporarily and strategically join forces against the parties that were 
supporting the government, fatally weakening them, emptying the center of the party system 
and producing the collapse of the regime itself.  
   Perhaps, the outlawing of the two extreme parties might have not been necessary. But the 
memories of Nazi and Stalinist Communist past behavior in addition to some harsh reality, after 
all, East German was on her way to become a sort of show case for Soviet Communism, advised 
German politicians to get rid of all possibilities for their reappearance. Both the Nazi and the 
Communist parties were declared unconstitutional in a short period of time by the German 
Constitutional Court. Several attempts were made by right‐wing political organizers to regroup 
former Nazi sympathizers and nostalgics. They all failed also because of the exclusion clause. As 
to the Communists, they have had an even harder time. With the disappearance of East 
Germany, literally swallowed by West Germany, the Communist Party of East Germany (SED, 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) found no difficulty in changing its name PDS (Partei 
des Demokratischen Sozialismus) partially renewing its leadership. Finally, it has entered into a 
coalition with left‐wing Socialdemocrats presenting joint candidates under the label Die Linke 
(The Left). 
Looking back to their constitutional history, German Constitution‐makers had nothing to recover 
and to polish. It immediately became clear that there was no memory either that could be put 
to use as a founding myth of what seemed in any case for several years a precarious Republic 
with a provisional Constitution. When asked in the late fifties in the context of an important 
cross‐national survey research what made them proud of being Germans, the item that received 
the highest percentage, around 50, of favorable responses was the German soziale 
Marktwirtschaft (social market economy). It is possible to state that the German economic 
miracle, something to be proud of for all Germans, also admirably served the purpose of making 
the legitimacy of the Constitution grow considerably. Technically, one ought to speak of political 
legitimacy acquired through economic performance. The Grundgesetz and the political system 
hereby designed could be evaluated in a favorable light because they accommodated and, on 
the whole, in slightly more than a decade, they gave a significant contribution to the appearance 
of an economic giant: an impressive success story.  
   Several important transformations followed in the political culture of the Germans, all 
supporting the new political system and providing a different conception of the role of Germany 
on the international scene, and even more in the European Union. In order to prevent any 
sliding back into a past characterized by the feelings of racial and cultural superiority, in 1979 a 
famous political theorist and political scientist, close to the Christian Democrats, Dolf 
Sternberger coined an expression Verfassungspatriotismus (constitutional patriotism) destined 
to become famous. However, the fame arrived only after the philosopher and sociologist Jürgen 
Habermas started preaching the importance of shared values to be found in the German 
Constitution (perhaps, in all “good” constitutions), as the most appropriate foundation for living 
together.   
          
Preliminary conclusions  
In the shaping and drafting of their respective constitutions, France, Italy, and Germany have 
gone through three quite different processes. The influence of the political memories of the 
Constitution‐makers and, subordinately, of their political culture was affected by significant 
historical factors as well as conscious decisions, but also by objective conditions/circumstances. 
The Constitution‐makers of the Fourth French Republic simply acted as if there was nothing to 
be learned from the memory of events, defeat, German occupation, a puppet regime, from the 
1940/1944 period and the weakness of their own Third Republic. They wanted to revive their 
politique comme d’habitude (politics as usual). It was only after the painful learning process of 
the sinking of the Fourth Republic that they were obliged to be rescued by Gen. de Gaulle and to 
bow to his views on how to construct a viable Republic capable of pursuing and maintaining the 
grandeur that is the hallmark of France. Here, the key element has been the fortunate existence 
of de Gaulle’s charismatic power and its institutionalization in the Fifth Republic.  
In Italy, memories of Fascism played an all important role. In fact, antifascism and the Resistance 
were propounded as the founding myth of the democratic and Republican Constitution. Several 
positive as well as negative consequences followed. On the positive side, the Constitution has 
successfully worked to constrain and assimilate into the democratic framework two anti‐system 
parties, the neo‐Fascists and the Communists. One could say that, in a way, the Communists tied 
their hands by overstressing their participation in and contribution to the drafting of the 
antifascist Constitution, while the neo‐Fascists adamantly opposed it. Once, after decades of 
uncritical (and perhaps hypocritical) extolling of the Constitution, all parties and political 
cultures were “assimilated” and integrated, however, it became clear not only that the founding 
myth was rejected because considered partisan and not truly national, but instead of relying on 
shared memories, a threatening challenge was launched. Not only are Italian political memories 
divided. They clash both on the nature and the interpretation of the Constitution and on the 
highly controversial need to reform it. 
No charismatic power after the dramatic experience with Hitler was desired. No founding myth 
could exist in a defeated and occupied Germany. Not even a full‐blown Constitution was bound 
to appear. There was space only for a low‐key, though technically highly innovative, 
Fundamental Norm, the Grundgesetz. This has proved the blueprint for success. Only one 
question arises: has the Grundgesetz been strengthened by German reunification or conflicts 
and tensions, some of them nourished by different political memories, descending from a huge 
historical achievement may stil harbor some unexpected challenges? Has Constitutional 
patriotism been revived in order to face and defeat those post‐unification challenges?  What if 
patriotism will have the upper hand on the constitutional norms?  
 
There are plenty of questions for my research in the making. The two most important ones 
refer, first, to the constitution‐makers themselves: who were they, how had they been selected, 
which kind of memories they entertained and made public; second, to the specific connection 
between political memories and institutional solutions, more precisely to the way the various 
solutions were offered, argued, and discussed and which ones carried the day and why.      
